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Abstract. In this paper, we analyze the process of performing the
universal verification of an electronic election. We propose a general
model of the election process and define the data flow into the verification
process. We also define the purpose and outcome of the verification process
and propose some general categories of tests to be performed during the
verification. As a guideline for dealing with negative verification outcomes,
we propose some general evaluation criteria for assessing the impact and
consequences of the encountered problem. Finally, we generalize the
proposed process models to the case of hybrid elections, in which multiple
voting channels are available simultaneously. The primary target audience
of this paper are people in charge of implementing and organizing verifiable
elections in practice.
1 Introduction
Universal verifiability is a key concept for making electronic voting systems
secure enough for using them in real political elections. It is a counter-measure
against all sorts of threads from very powerful adversaries, which for example
may try manipulate the election result by taking control over some of the central
system components. To prevent such attacks, the system generates some public
election data during the election process, which can be used to reconstruct the
final election result in a publicly verifiable manner. Independent third parties
(auditors) can then be invited to verify the correctness of the election result based
on the cryptographic evidence included in the public election data. Provided that
the verification has succeeded, one can then conclude that no such attacks have
been conducted. By providing this simple functionality, universal verifiability is a
very important trust-establishing measure. Its ultimate goal is to convince even
the losers of an election to accept the result [7, 11].
1.1 Universal Verifiability in Practice
One of the major challenges of building a universally verifiable election system
is to provide verifiability simultaneously with vote secrecy. Many cryptographic
protocols have been invented for that purpose. Their main problem is to define the
verification process in a way that the correct election result can be reconstructed
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without explicitly decrypting the submitted encrypted votes. For this, some
anonymization mechanism must be applied to the submitted votes to unlink them
from the voters. Techniques for solving this problem, for example mix-nets or
homomorphic tallying, are well-understood today and widely applied. Practical
systems using these technologies have been introduced for both academic and
real-world purposes [2–6].
Based on today’s generally accepted understanding that verifiability is crucial
for electronic elections, countries such as Switzerland and Estonia have decided to
update the requirements for their existing e-voting systems. The following quote
from the Federal Chancellery Ordinance on Electronic Voting (VEleS) underlines
this change of paradigm in Switzerland [1, page 3]:
“Auditors receive proof that the result has been ascertained correctly. They
must evaluate the proof in a observable procedure. To do this, they must
use technical aids that are independent of and isolated from the rest of
the system.”
To fulfill the extended requirements, the two remaining Swiss e-voting system
providers have launched corresponding development projects. By releasing a
detailed and comprehensive protocol specification together with two different
proof-of-concept implementations [8,9], the CHVote project of the State of Geneva
has reached an important milestone in 2017. The launch of the new system, which
is currently being developed according to the specification, is planned for the 2019
parliament elections. Similar plans exist for the system offered by the Post CH
Ltd, which has officially reached an intermediate expansion stage in early 2018. In
both projects, the legal ordinance is clear about implementing proper verification
processes along with the introduction of the next-generation systems. However,
since VEleS does not further specify the details of such processes, it does not
provide sufficient legal grounds for most of the conclusions and recommendations
contained this paper.
1.2 Goals and Overview
Despite the recent developments in Switzerland and other places in the world, only
little experience exists with respect to conducting an actual verification process
for real political elections. The foremost problem is the necessity of providing
suitable technical aids that offer the desired functionality while satisfying the
requirement of being independent from the rest of the system. In some of the above-
mentioned systems, such technical aids have never been developed. This leads to
a paradoxical situations, where systems are promoted as (potentially) verifiable,
but without offering the full package for performing an actual verification.
Another problem is the lack of a common understanding of the exact purpose
of a verification and the necessary processes around it. Simple questions like
what are the exact input data of a verification process and what are the possible
verification results have never been defined in a precise manner. Such a high-level
view of the verification process is the main topic of this paper. The goal is to
lay the foundations for introducing universal verification into existing and future
electoral processes. For this, we look at the commonalities of existing e-voting
protocols, propose a high-level summary of the relevant data flow, and finally
derive general models for both the election and the verification processes. The
paper is written mainly from a technical perspective. Related political, legal, or
sociological questions are deliberately left aside.
We will start in Section 2 with a general model of the election process, which
defines the principal data flow. This model is general enough to be applicable to
both electronic and non-electronic election processes. Based on this model, we
propose a definition of the verification process. Particular attention is given to the
verification result, which we decompose into five main categories. We also discuss
the development process of corresponding verification software. In Section 3,
we use the generality of the election process model to define corresponding
processes for hybrid voting systems, which provides multiple (electronic and non-
electronic) voting channels simultaneously. In this particular setting, additional
considerations are necessary to guarantee the completeness of the verification
chain. Section 4 summarizes the findings and concludes the paper.
2 Universally Verifiable Elections
An election system’s principal function is to establish the correct election result
based on the votes submitted by the voters. This should be done in a way that even
the losers of the election will accept the result as correct. In a paper-based election
system, this functionality is achieved by involving trustworthy people from all
parties in the tallying process. In case of observed or suspected irregularities,
election authorities can order a re-tally of the votes by independent third parties
to remove any existing doubts. In an electronic election system, this is exactly
the purpose of conducting a universal verification, but the evidence necessary
for inferring the correctness of the result is derived from cryptographic methods
rather than human supervision. Irregularities caused by attacks or software bugs
can then be detected in a reliable way. The purposes of re-tallying paper votes
and universally verifying electronic votes are therefore largely equivalent.
2.1 Election Process
In order to define universal verification more precisely, we must first introduce
an abstract model of an election process. To provide compatibility with most
existing election protocols, we suppress technical details as far as possible. A
common denominator is the election period, during which voters can submit
their votes. Independently of the exact length of this period, it defines a natural
decomposition of the whole election process into three consecutive phases:
pre-election phase ⇒ election phase ⇒ post-election phase.
Each phase generates its own part of the election process data, which contains
the auxiliary cryptographic evidence required to perform the verification of the
election result. For the general understanding of the election and verification
processes, it is not necessary to further specify the exact content of this data,
but it is important to keep in mind that this data is public. Usually, it is written
to a public bulletin board, from which it can be retrieved by anyone who wants
to perform the verification. The election process data is depicted in Figure 1 as
one of the main outputs of the election process.
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Fig. 1: Abstract model and data flow of an election process.
One of the main inputs of the election process is a document called election
definition, which defines the details of the election, for example the questions and
voting options in a referendum or the list of candidates and election rules in an
election. A second input document, which we call electorate, contains the list of
eligible voters. This document is needed to determine the voter’s eligibility and
therefore decide about the validity of a submitted vote. Another input document,
which we call process definition, specifies the details of the election process, for
example the start and the end of the election period, but also the identities of the
parties and authorities involved in the process or the cryptographic parameters
to be used. The party responsible for providing the three input documents is
called election administrator. Our distinction between election definition and
process definition is important in the hybrid setting discussed in Section 3, where
a single election definition is combined with two or more process definitions.
The most important output of the election process is the election result. We
do not further specify the contents of this document, except that we assume that
it summarizes the outcome of the election tally, for example by summing up the
number of yes/no-votes in a referendum or by simply enumerating all decrypted
votes in cleartext. This document represents therefore the official result, which
is publicly announced in the aftermath of the election. For this, it is important
for this document to contain a signature from the election administrator, which
guarantees the correctness of its contents.
The same remark about containing a signature holds for the three input
documents and for most parts of the elections process data. We summarize this
aspect of the model by assuming an additional output called authentication data
(yellow-highlighted in Figure 1). In a purely electronic setting, this output will
consists of a list of digital signatures with corresponding certificates, from which
the authenticity and integrity of all input and output documents can be inferred.
As we will see in the next subsection, this aspect defines a particular category of
verification steps, which can be performed independently of the rest.
We already mentioned that we kept this process model simple enough for
applying it also to the case of non-electronic elections. In that case, some (but not
necessarily all) of the involved documents will be paper documents signed by the
people that generated them. They may contain declarations that certain manual
tasks of the process have been conducted according to the specified procedures.
In case of detected irregularities, the existence of such documents can help in
identifying the person responsible for causing or overlooking the problem. They
are therefore needed for ensuring the plausibility of the election result.
2.2 Verification Process
The process of verifying an electronic election based on the available public data
is depicted in Figure 2. The input of the verification process consists of all the
public inputs and outputs of the election process model from the previous section.
We refer to it as the election data and assume that it is available to any person
who wants to perform a verification. Note that we consider the election result as
part of the election data, which must be checked for correctness. The purpose
of the verification process is to perform a series of tests on the election data,
which collectively give enough evidence to assess the correctness of the election
result. A compilation of the results obtained from performing the necessary tests
is what we call the verification report. This document is the principal output of
the verification process. The software that generates the verification report based
on the election data is called verifier.
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Fig. 2: Abstract model of the verification process.
By defining the verification as a series of individual tests performed by the
verifier, it is possible to introduce at least five different top-level categories,
according to which the tests can be grouped in a meaningful way (further
meaningful categories and sub-categories may exist in more concrete cases). In
Table 1, we summarize the meaning of these categories and their differences. One
of the purposes of introducing such test categories is to facilitate and systematize
the definition of a suitable test catalog, which ultimately leads to a fully connected
verification chain. This test catalog is the main content of the verifier specification
(see Section 2.4). Another purpose of introducing categories is to simplify the
organization and presentation of the test results in the verification report.
Category Description
Completeness Do the available data elements cover the whole election process
according to the specification? Do they allow a complete verification
chain?
Integrity Do all data elements correspond to the protocol specification? Are
they all within the specified ranges?
Consistency Are related data elements consistent to each other?
Evidence Are the cryptographic proofs contained in the election data all valid?
Do they provide the necessary evidence to infer the correctness of
corresponding protocol steps?
Authenticity Can the data elements be linked unambiguously to the party autho-
rized to create them?
Table 1: Test categories of the verification process.
An example of a verifier’s user interface is depicted Figure 3. It shows the
upper part of the verification report for an election at the University of Zu¨rich
in 2013 using the UniVote system [4, 10]. The status bar in the upper right
corner indicates that the verification is still in progress. The report also shows
the results of the first eleven (out of 61) tests. Nine tests succeeded, one test has
been dropped due to a missing certificate, and one test failed due to an invalid
signature. Assuming that the verifier itself works properly, this indicates that
parts of the implemented voting system have not been working properly, or even
worse that the election has been exposed to an attack. In any case, it is clear that
both the cause and the impact of the exposed problems have to be investigated.
Triggering such an investigation in case of irregularities is the main purpose of
performing the verification.
2.3 Impact and Consequences of Failed Tests
As illustrated by the above example, using a verifier to conduct the verification
of an election can always lead to a situation, in which some tests from the test
Fig. 3: User interface of the verifier for the UniVote system.
catalog have failed. There are numerous possible causes for a test to fail, but there
is presumably no better way for finding the cause than analyzing the particular
problem at hand. Giving general recommendations about handling failure cases
is therefore quite difficult. Nevertheless, we can at least propose three different
evaluation criteria, which may help to classify the impact of the problem and to
decide about the next steps.
The first criteria is the maximal number of affected votes. Suppose that N
electronic votes have been submitted and that maximally 0 ≤ k ≤ N votes are
affected by the problem.1 Note that this constraint includes the two natural
limiting cases of k = 0 (no vote affected) and k = N (all votes affected). Another
important quantity is the number ∆R of votes, which are necessary to change
the winner or the outcome of an election. In a referendum, the general constraint
for this number is 1 ≤ ∆R ≤ N2 . For example, for 60 yes-votes, 30 no-votes,
10 blank votes, and therefore N = 100, the outcome could be changed by
turning 15 yes-votes into no-votes. For judging the impact of the problem, it is
therefore important to determine if k is smaller or bigger than ∆R = 15. For
1 ≤ k < ∆R, the impact of the problem may not justify the invalidation of
the whole election (similar arguments are used to handle minor irregularities in
1 In a hybrid election process, both the number of electronic votes and the total number
of votes must be taken into consideration.
paper-based elections), but in the more severe case of k ≥ ∆R, repeating the
whole election can probably not be avoided.
The second criteria refers to the security goal violated by the detected problem.
Relative to a single submitted vote, three cases must be distinguished: a violation
of the vote’s secrecy, a violation of the vote’s integrity, or a violation of both
the vote’s secrecy and integrity.2 Generally, we consider violations of the vote’s
integrity to be more critical than violations of the vote’s secrecy, because they
affect the election results in a direct way. The possible consequences are therefore
more drastic in such cases. In Figure 4 we give an overview of the consequences in
the scenarios obtained from combining the first two evaluation criteria. It shows
for example that vote secrecy violations do not directly invalidate the election
result, but that an investigation of the problem’s cause is always necessary.
Result confirmed Result confirmed Result confirmed
Vote Secrecy Vote Integrity Vote Secrecy & Integrity
k=0
Result confirmed
Initiate investigation
Stop using the system
Result questionable
Initiate investigation
Stop using the system
Result questionable
Initiate investigation
Stop using the system
k< ∆R
Result confirmed
Initiate investigation
Stop using the system
Result not confirmed
Initiate investigation
Stop using the system
Result not confirmed
Initiate investigation
Stop using the system
k ≥ ∆R 
Fig. 4: Problem scenarios with consequences.
Another important point to consider in case of an unsuccessful verification
is the question of whether the problem could possibly be solved by repeating
some steps of the election process. For example, the case of a missing or invalid
signature could possibly be solved by simply repeating the signature generation.
Generally, such recovery procedures mostly exist for data that is not temporarily
linked to other parts of the election data. In those cases, only the availability of
the data is necessary to conduct the verification, not their moment of creation.
Problems encountered with such data can therefore be solved by repeating their
creation during a recovery procedure.
Assuming that recovery procedures exist, pursuing them will always be the
first choice in case of encountering a problem in the verification report. A general
business process model for handling failure cases is depicted in Figure 5. It
shows that executing a recovery procedure invokes an additional verification
2 The main purpose of the universal verification is detecting integrity violations.
However, the failing of certain tests can also lead to situations, in which vote secrecy
is no longer guaranteed, for example if the signatures of the mixing proofs are all
invalid. This could mean that all mixing proofs have been generated by the same
party, which can then establish links from cleartext votes to voters.
round. If the problem persists—or if no recovery procedure has existed from the
beginning—then an investigation of the problem must be invoked and the result
of the investigation must be documented in a report.
 Verify 
election data
Publish 
result/report
Investigate
problem
Perform
recovery
Election 
Data
Report
Report
yes
yes no
no
Result
confirmed?
Recoverable?
Fig. 5: Process model for handling failure cases and recovering from them.
2.4 Developing the Verifier
The principal technical aid for conducting the verification of an election is the
verifier. Clearly, the proper functioning of the verifier is a mandatory precondition
for obtaining conclusive verification reports. It is therefore essential that the
verifier works exactly in accordance with the specified cryptographic protocol.
Any deviation could lead to unpleasant situations in which the verifier reports
a failure when everything is correct (false negative) or misses a failure when
something went wrong (false positive). In a nutshell, the software development
goal for the verifier consists in avoiding these situations altogether.
Given the mathematical and technical complexities of cryptographic voting
protocols, developing a verifier directly from the protocol specification is a very big
challenge. It requires advanced skills in both applied cryptography and software
development. If unqualified personnel is in charge of this task, it is likely that
the implemented test catalog will not form a complete verification chain, or that
some tests are implemented incorrectly. In both cases, the conclusiveness of the
verification report is weakened considerably.
To ensure the required functionality and software quality, we propose a two-
step procedure for developing the verifier. The first step consists in deriving a
specification document from the specification of the voting system. This task
should be performed by cryptography experts that are familiar with voting
protocols in general and with the specific technical details of the voting protocol
at hand (possibly by the designers of the voting protocol). The main part of this
document is the aforementioned test catalog, which together must form a complete
verification chain. To assure the completeness of this chain, assembling the test
catalog must be carried out with meticulous precision. To detect remaining gaps
as early as possible, we also recommend applying a thorough reviewing process
to this document. For maximal transparency, we also recommend the publication
of this document.
Verifier
Election System
Specification Code Execution Election Data
Code Execution Verification ReportSpecification
Fig. 6: Developing and executing the verifier based on a separate specification
document.
Developing the actual software based on the verifier’s specification is the second
step of the proposed procedure (see Figure 6). This task can be delegated to a
software engineer with only moderate background knowledge in cryptography and
cryptographic protocols. To achieve general software quality properties, standard
software design and coding principles should be applied to the development
process. Code reviewing is another important method to establish the desired
code quality. For maximal transparency, we also recommend to publish the source
code and to invite the public to participate in reviewing the code.
Additional preconditions for developing the verifier are a precise interface
description for obtaining the election data from the voting system and the
availability of some meaningful test data. Both preconditions must be met by the
developers of the voting system. Ideally, the test data also contains inconsistencies
or flaws, such that the developed software can be tested for false positives and
false negatives. Finally, it is also very important to implement a strict versioning
policy, because even the slightest change in the voting system or in the election
data may be enough to affect the proper functioning of the verifier.
3 Hybrid Election Processes
The election and verification processes as discussed so far are only directly
applicable to the simple case of a purely electronic election with a single voting
channel. The situation usually gets more complicated if multiple voting channels
are offered simultaneously. The simplest way of handling multiple channels is to
let the voters choose their preferred channel prior to an election. This leads to
a decomposition of the electorate, which finally results in conducting multiple
elections independently of each other. In this case, no channel coordination other
than summing up the individual election results is necessary. If one of the channels
is an electronic one, the verification can therefore be conducted in isolation using
the process described in the previous section.
A more complicated situation arises if voters can choose the voting channel
spontaneously during the election period. The composition of corresponding
election processes is called a hybrid election process, and we will see in this
section that extra precautions are necessary to handle this case properly. We are
particularly interested in hybrid election processes because they correspond to
the current plans in Switzerland of offering the electronic channel in addition to
the two existing voting channels (postal mail, in person). The question that we
want to address here is how to conduct the verification of the electronic votes, if
postal voting or voting in person takes place simultaneously.
3.1 Extending the Election and Verification Processes
The major problem that arises in a hybrid election process is to ensure that no
voter submits more than one vote over the available channels. This implies that
using one channel for submitting a vote must disqualify the voter in every other
channel. It is clear that implementing this seemingly simple principle requires
accurate coordination between the channels. In practice, it turns out that the
submission of multiple votes over multiple channels can not be avoided completely,
even if doing so is illegal. If this happens, it should at least not be possible that
two votes from the same voter are counted. Double votes from the same voter
must therefore be eliminated—together with other invalid ballots—before starting
the tallying process. This process, which is called cleansing, is a mandatory initial
step of the post-election phase.
From the perspective of the election process model of Section 2.1, an additional
input containing the list of disqualified voters is required to perform the cleansing
of the submitted ballots before initiating the tally. This leads to the extended
election process model of Figure 7. The actual electorate that is relevant for the
tally is obtained from eliminating the disqualified voters from the electorate. The
model depicted in Figure 7 also shows that the list of actual election participants
is an additional output of the process. This list defines the disqualified voters in
every other voting channel of the hybrid system. In the next subsection, we will
see how to combine two or multiple such election processes into a hybrid election
process.
The additional input and output documents in the extended election process
model must be taken into account when performing the verification. Note that
every single entry in each of these documents is highly critical, because they
define somebody’s right to submit a vote over some channel. Figure 8, which
shows the extended verification process model, illustrates the inclusion of these
documents. The purpose of the verification report is still the same, but since two
additional inputs are now taken into account, a successful report also validates
their contents.
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Fig. 7: Extended election process model for hybrid elections.
3.2 Composed Election Processes
Let’s now have a closer look at actual compositions of multiple election processes.
We will restrict ourselves to the simplest case of composing two alternative
election processes. As we will see, the result of such a composition is again an
election process, which can be further combined with other election processes.
In this way, it is possible to construct recursive process models for more compli-
cated combinations of three or more voting channels on the basis of the basic
compositions described here.
For analyzing the composition of two election processes, we can distinguish
two opposed cases. In the case of a serial composition, the temporal availability of
the two channels is exclusive, i.e., the election period of the first election process
strictly precedes the election period of the second process. Figure 9 depicts the
hybrid process model obtained from a serial composition. It shows that the list
of participants from the first channel defines the list of disqualified voters in the
second channel. Note that the inverse data flow from the second channel back
into the first channel is not required to guarantee the detection of double votes.
Serial compositions are therefore relatively easy to handle properly.
More complicated situations arise in the case of a parallel composition, in
which the election periods of the two processes overlap. In this case, the data
exchange between the two channels is mutual. The resulting process model is
depicted in Figure 10. It shows how the list of participants from each of the two
channels is given as an additional input into the other channel. The problem
here is that the same voter may appear in both lists, which must be taken into
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Fig. 8: Extended verification process model for hybrid elections.
account in each of the two cleansing processes. To handle such cases properly,
there must be a clear policy of prioritizing one of the two submitted votes.
We see three different general strategies for defining such a policy. We will
shortly discuss them in the remaining of this section. For this, we consider the
use case from Switzerland, where an electronic voting channel is combined with a
physical voting channel (postal mail). We assume that an electronic vote counts as
“submitted” when the voter terminates the voting process, for example by clicking
a button from the voting application’s user interface. In case of submitting a
paper ballot using postal mail, we assume that the vote counts as “submitted”
when the ballot is registered at the polling station. Note that in Switzerland,
submitting more than one vote is prohibited by law, regardless of the available
voting channels. However, since voters are instructed to submit a paper vote in
case of a problem encountered when submitting an electronic vote, enforcing
this law will be difficult in practice. In other countries, for example in Norway,
submitting multiple votes is explicitly allowed. In such a case, the last submitted
vote overrides all previously submitted votes.
Prioritizing the Physical Channel. The rule here is as follows: if the same
voter uses both channels to submit a vote, only the vote submitted over the
physical channel will be counted. With this policy, paper votes can be counted
regardless of the list of participants from the electronic channel. Therefore, the
problem of eliminating double votes is only relevant for the electronic channel.
Note that this situation is similar to a serial composition, in which the physical
channel precedes the electronic channel. This policy is therefore relatively simple
to implement. It is also compatible with a current practice in Switzerland, where
administrative staff at the electoral office separates paper votes from the signed
polling cards right upon receiving the paper ballot.
Election
Definition
Electorate
Process
Definition 2
Process
Definition 1
Election Process  1
Election Process 2
Disqualified Voters
Participants
Election 
Result
Fig. 9: Serial composition of two election processes.
Prioritizing the Electronic Channel. Here, the rule from above is applied
in the opposite way, i.e., only the electronic vote of a voter using both channels
is counted. The counting of the electronic votes can therefore be conducted
regardless of the list of participants from the physical channel. This also simplifies
the verification process, which can be conducted independently of the physical
channel, but it makes the counting of the paper ballots at the polling station
more complicated. For example, separating the paper votes from the signed
polling cards must be postponed until the complete list of participants from the
electronic channel is available.
Prioritizing the First or Last Submitted Vote. In this case, if someone
submits two votes over both channels, only the first or the last submitted vote
will be counted. This is the most complicated policy to implement, because the
channels are mutually dependent on each other, i.e., exchanging both lists of
participants according the Figure 10 is a mandatory precondition for eliminating
double votes in both channels. The exchange of these lists can be done in two
ways, either dynamically during the election phase or in a single step at the
end of the election phase. In the dynamic case, the two voting channels may
try to sort out double votes at the moment of receiving them, but a perfect
synchronization is obviously very difficult to implement. Therefore, conducting
the cleansing process at the end of the election phase is necessary in either case.
To enable the prioritization of either the first or the last submitted vote,
timestamps must be added to the lists of participants, which define the exact
moment of submitting the vote. The decision of keeping or ignoring a submitted
vote is then based on these timestamps. Note the issuing reliable timestamps in
an electronic context is a difficult problem on its own, especially if third parties
must be able to verify the correctness of the timestamps in a conclusive way.
Election Process 1
Election Process  2
Election
Definition
Process 
Definition 1
Process
Definition 2
Electorate
Election 
Result
Fig. 10: Parallel composition of two election processes.
4 Conclusion
This paper is an attempt to define the universal verification process for electronic
elections. The motivation for this paper comes from the observation that there
is almost no practical experience with conducting actual verifications. On the
other hand, since universal verifiability is commonly recognized as one of the
most important counter-measures against all sorts of failures or attacks, almost
everyone agrees that it must be implemented into future e-voting systems that
are used for real political elections. Our analysis of the verification process in
this paper shows that conducting an actual verification is more complex than
it may appear at first sight. By discussing some of the most apparent questions
and problems, we hope to provide some general technical guidelines for people in
charge of implementing or organizing a verification process.
In most parts of the paper, for making our analysis and findings as widely
applicable as possible, we have adopted a very general perspective. However,
relative to a concrete voting system and application use case, many specific
questions only arise if all the details about the cryptographic voting protocol, the
technical system specification, and the political and legal contexts are available.
Therefore, we can not answer these questions here, but we recommend not to
underestimate the problems that may arise. More generally, we recommend to pay
attention to the difficulties of the verification process well in advance. Election
organizers should look at it as a separate important project, which also requires
a careful planning, proper management, and adequate budget.
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